



I am delighted to contribute a foreword to this important book.  I say this for two reasons: first because I am deeply committed to the notion of religious literacy as such and second, because the chapters that follow explore this idea in new ways, each of which reflects a particular situation.  Religious literacy must be engaged in context:  getting it right can make all the difference; getting it wrong can make a tricky situation even worse.

What has led us to talk in these terms?  In order to capture what is happening, we need to step back a little and examine the different factors that contribute to the religious situation in modern Britain – and indeed in much of Europe.  These are outlined below.  Each factor is important in its own right but the crucial point to grasp is that they push and pull in different directions:  some indicate greater secularization, others the reverse.  It is the combination that exposes the need for religious literacy.

The first factor relates to the role of the historic churches in shaping European culture.  Other influences were important (notably Greek rationalism and Roman organization) but the Judaeo-Christian tradition has without doubt had a lasting impact on European society – in for example the framing of time and space in this part of the world, and in establishing the categories within which we think about religion.  Nobody pretends however that the historic churches are able to discipline the beliefs and behaviour of British people in the twenty-first century – indeed the very idea is offensive.  They remain none the less important points of reference at particular moments in the lives of individuals and communities, and indeed of the nation itself.  That said the number of people who think in these terms is declining and more secular ways of marking the highs and lows of life (both individual and collective) are becoming increasingly popular. Taken together, these shifts are evidence of secularization – the process is gradual and uneven, but undeniable.

It is not, however, the whole story.  New forms of religious life are beginning to emerge as an observable change takes place in the churchgoing constituencies of Britain.  These are operating increasingly on a model of choice, rather than a model of obligation or duty.  The implications are important.  Churchgoing declines overall, but those who continue to be active in this sphere do so because they want to rather than because they have to; their motives, moreover are more likely to be ‘religious’ than, say, habitual, social or political.  The range of choice, moreover, widens all the time and now includes significant other faith communities, brought to this country by the individuals (mostly from the New Commonwealth) who responded to the call for new sources of labour in the mid post-war decades.  This influx established new religious constituencies in Britain at least some of which have very different aspirations in terms of their religious lives compared with those of the host society.  Specifically the line between public and private is differently formulated.

What has become known as the ‘Rushdie controversy’ constitutes a pivotal moment in this process, marking important shifts in the religious landscape.  It is at this point, for example, that racial and ethnic differences begin to give way to religious ones in public discussions about diversity. This is particularly significant for the Muslim population, whose shared dismay at the publication of The Satanic Verses drew them together.   Muslim identity became a unifying factor for a community that comprises a wide variety of nationalities and ethnicities.   The stakes, moreover, were high as the relative merits of two ‘freedoms’ were hotly debated:  freedom of religion on the one hand and freedom of speech on the other.  The Muslim community invoked the former (faith should be inviolate), whilst Salman Rushdie and his supporters were claiming the latter (the right to publish freely). Self-conscious secularism is an important consequence of this conflict; indeed, it becomes a factor in its own right – a counterweight to seriously held religion.

A particularly revealing moment occurred at the end of 1990 when Rushdie claimed to have embraced Islam.  With every appearance of sincerity, he declared himself a Muslim, apologizing to his co-religionists for the problems caused by the book and acknowledging that some passages were offensive to believers.  In effect this was an admission of blasphemy.  Financial contributions from the book’s royalties would be made to those who had suffered injury as a result of the protests; in other words reparations would be made.  Though short-lived, Rushdie’s attempt to build bridges seemed genuine enough and brought some comfort to the Muslim community in Britain.  The point to note, however, is that the gesture provoked an equally potent reaction from the opposing camp.  The rage of the secular liberals at this point could hardly be contained, revealing an alarming illogicality at the heart of their campaign.  Muslims should be tolerant of offensive books, but liberals cannot tolerate the writer who becomes a Muslim.  Tolerance, it is clear, was a social construct, to be applied in some cases but not in others.  

Just as troubling was the genuine incomprehension of the British public, who had great difficulty grasping the hurt of the Muslim community after the initial publication.  Quite simply, the religious sensibilities of most British people were of a different order.  Assuming a relatively relaxed approach to religious issues it was hard to understand why the publication of a book caused such anger when no-one was obliged to read it against their will.  So why not leave it at that?  Part of being British, it seemed, was to accept a low-key approach to religion, with the strong implication that anyone who comes to live in these islands – for whatever reason – should conform, in public at least, to a similar view.  But does this essentially conditional statement provide an adequate basis for a tolerant and pluralist society?  The unexpected vehemence of the ensuing controversy indicates that it does not.

In short the ground was shifting:  away from rather casual assumptions about religion being a private matter, operating on a live and let-live basis, to something sharper and more confrontational.   The implications for religious literacy are multiple.  Before looking at these in more detail, however, one final factor must be addressed.  That is a growing realization that the patterns of religious life in modern Europe should be considered an ‘exceptional case’; they are not a global prototype.  Britain, like the rest of Europe, is relatively secular; the rest of the world is not – a fact substantiated by looking at the very different patterns of religion in the United States, the growth of Pentecostalism in the global South, the huge variety of religious practice within the Muslim world, the intractable situation in the Middle East, the intensities of the Indian sub-continent, the changes on the Pacific rim and, most significant of all, what appears to be happening in China.  This is not the moment to deny the significance of religion in the modern world order.

But even in Britain, we need to pay attention.  Looking carefully at the factors set out above, it is clear that two things are happening at once.  On the one hand are the increasing levels of secularity, which lead in turn to an inevitable decline in religious knowledge as well as in religious belief.  On the other is a series of increasingly urgent debates about religion in public life, prompted by the need to accommodate new populations, who bring with them very different ways of being religious.  This largely unexpected combination is difficult to manage, a fact which is hardly surprising.  British people are losing their knowledge of religion (i.e. of vocabulary, concept, and narrative) just when they need this most, given the require​ment, on an increasingly regular basis, to pass judgement on the rights and obligations of the very varied religious actors (individual and corporate) which currently cohabit in this country. The consequent debates all too often are both ill-informed and ill-mannered, as questions that were considered closed are not only re-opened, but engaged with little or no preparation. The Rushdie controversy illustrates every one of the statements; it was moreover but one acrimonious affair among many.

There are no easy answers – unsurprisingly given that the situation requires both an imaginative response and careful attention to detail.  The imaginative response lies in moving on from mid-twentieth century expectations to twenty-first century realities, a particularly painful shift for those trained in social science. The roots of this discipline – or more accurately disciplines – go back to the nineteenth century; they were part and parcel of the upheavals associated with the industrialization process in Europe and the changes in society that followed suit.  Transformations in the field of religion were integral to this process as the forms of religious life that fitted so well into pre-industrial ways of living came under severe strain as populations moved away from rural areas to the rapidly growing cities of ‘modern’ Europe.  At the same time the onslaughts of the Enlightenment took their toll.  All too often, however, the wrong inference was drawn: namely that all forms of modern society were necessarily inimical to religion whether at home or further afield – an attitude that reached its peak in the 1960s, the decade in which social science expanded exponentially.  Was this or was it not a coincidence?

Whatever the case, the world-changing events of the late twentieth century came as something of a shock.  No one was expecting the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the fall of communism in 1989 or the devastating attack on the Twin Towers in 2001.  These are complex, multi-causal events which require careful analysis.  Religion, however, was a central factor in all of them and clearly able to motivate widely different groups of people.  At the very least, it was proving itself more durable than many had imagined possible.  But once again the wrong inference was drawn.  The tendency this time was to assume that religion was resurgent or back, reasoning that we are now in a post-secular – rather than a post religious – situation.  To argue thus, however, is to conflate two rather different things.  Was it really the case that religion (or God) was back?  Or was it simply that the disciplines of social science, along with a wide variety of policy makers, had now become aware (or re-aware) of something that had been there all the time?  In other words, is it perceptions that have altered rather than reality?  It is in fact a mixture of both: new forms of religion have asserted themselves in unexpected ways in different parts of the world.  That is clear.  It is incorrect however to assume that these emerged from a vacuum. In almost all global regions, the presence of religion has not only been continuous but taken for granted; only in Europe might this statement be questioned, and then only partially.

It is, however, the partial and complex reality discovered in twenty-first Britain that the Religious Literacy Leadership Programme (RLLP) seeks to address.  As we have seen, Britain is becoming more secular – steadily so.  At the same time, new arrivals have brought to this country very different ways of being religious (predictably enough given their provenance), leading at times to painful confrontations.   Thirdly, British people who look outwards are aware that the situation elsewhere is markedly different from that at home.  For all these reasons a more developed knowledge of religion, together with the ability to speak well about this subject, is becoming a requirement rather than an option.  It is to the credit of the RLLP that they had both the vision to see this and the energy to tackle the problem – beginning with their work in higher education.  Universities, they rightly maintain, have a special role in shaping the environment in which learning and development unfold, influencing in turn the attitudes and understandings of a generation who will guide society for the foreseeable future.

Since then, the RLLP has ‘diversified’, in the sense that it is beginning to penetrate a variety of sectors, which include the media, the workplace, welfare providers, advice and equality bodies and government officials.  This volume extends the remit even further addressing a range of topics under three headings:  theory, policy and practice.  It is here, moreover, that the attention to detail matters as each story develops in its own way.  It is not a case of one size fits all.  It is rather a question of finding exactly how to address the difficult questions that arise with respect to religion in particular institution or profession, aware that each of these has its own history, culture and ways of working.  It is with this in mind that I recommend this volume with enthusiasm; in both concept and detail, it impresses.
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